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This paper is meant to impart critical knowledge to new and upcoming spacecraft developers (universities, high 
schools, research centers, young commercial companies, etc.) regarding lessons learned that they can implement to 
create successful spacecraft missions. This perspective comes from NanoRacks, a “space access provider”, where 
we’ve gained enormous expertise on how to design and build to requirements driven by human-rated spaceflight. As 
we all know, operating in space is only half of the battle. 
INTRODUCTION 
Developing small spacecraft has provided 
unprecedented educational experiences for thousands of 
students, from elementary school students to doctoral 
candidates. The ability to design, build, launch, and 
operate a spacecraft under a relatively small budget and 
comparatively short timeline has enormous benefits to all 
facets of aerospace. Small spacecraft have also proven to 
be legitimate research platforms, providing scientists and 
startup companies invaluable data, and avenues to 
produce viable commercial products. The community 
around small satellites has spurred an established 
commercial sector dedicated to the engineering of these 
modern marvels.  
Having flown over 220 satellites to low-Earth orbit 
(LEO) through the International Space Station (ISS) 
Program, NanoRacks has garnered valuable insight on 
how to comply with manned spaceflight requirements. 
These satellites fly with NanoRacks through a variety of 
methods: international collaborations such as the QB-50 
Program, grant awards from the NASA Launch Service 
Program (LSP), technology development projects from 
Department of Defense (DoD), research programs from 
government/NASA centers, and an array of commercial 
companies such as Planet and Spire Global.  
NanoRacks has strived to ensure requirements are launch 
vehicle agnostic for spacecraft flying to the International 
Space Station. In the background, we have worked to get 
the manned spaceflight community comfortable with 
small satellites deploying and operating from life-
sustaining infrastructure. Having the ISS as a reliable 
deployment platform has allowed for tremendous growth 
of the CubeSat and small satellite industry.  
By helping spacecraft navigate through the extremely 
complex ISS payload processing system over the last 5 
years, we’ve determined the areas of major concern for 
satellite developers, some of which can end a mission. 
This paper outlines some of the issues we’ve identified. 
We aim to provide advice on how to mitigate concerns 
and create successful missions through informed 
research, proper planning, and principles to follow.  
This paper covers a select few areas that NanoRacks has 
seen as the largest obstacles for satellite developers. Each 
topic is not explored in great detail, so further research 
should be done based on the main points from each 
section. 
SATELLITE BUS & MISSION DESIGN 
In Space Mission Analysis and Design, Wertz and Larson 
recommend the first step of a satellite mission be 
defining the mission objective.1 Understanding the scope 
is the first challenge a spacecraft developer faces; since 
the end goal will define the entire life of the project, it 
should not be taken lightly. For new payload and satellite 
developers, focus is the key to success.  
Payload Selection 
To design a successful mission, NanoRacks recommends 
selecting a single science objective (possibly two) and 
maintaining focus on that goal. If the payload will be 
developed in-house, the remaining subsystems should be 
outsourced, if possible. 
The first consideration of payload design is the amount 
of volume available in the spacecraft structure. If the 
spacecraft is 1U in size, the payload cannot also be 1U. 
The rest of the critical subsystems (avionics board(s), 
power system, attitude determination and control system 
(ADCS), Radio Frequency (RF) system, etc) quickly add 
up and leave little room for a complicated payload. 
Therefore, the size of the satellite is a great place to start 
defining payload mission objectives.  
If a 1U CubeSat feels too cramped, obviously a 2U or 3U 
size will offer more volume for the payload. However, 
the increased volume most certainly increases the 
spacecraft launch cost and sometimes complexity as 
well. Developing a payload from scratch is no small 
undertaking, and universities with small science 
departments or few Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on 
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staff will find this especially challenging. The payload 
must fit mechanically, be integrated in the overall 
electrical system of the satellite, function properly, be 
able to adhere to the environment of the spacecraft’s 
orbit, and be built to withstand a full range of testing. 
Planning an especially extravagant payload without 
dedicated expertise and resources can be a mission killer.  
If the budget is small and the team inexperienced, 
NanoRacks recommends that developers focus on a 
smaller payload that still advances technology and has 
scientific value. Establish a clear goal that is within 
grasp, such as raising the technology readiness level 
(TRL) of an existing sensor or procuring the payload 
commercially. Plenty of valuable scientific data can be 
produced without reinventing the wheel. Just building a 
satellite, especially for a new developer, can still be 
extraordinarily educational and potentially useful for the 
scientific community.  
Bus Design 
NanoRacks classifies payload design separately from the 
satellite bus design. The implementation of satellite bus 
components should also go through the same review 
phase as the rest of the subsystems on the spacecraft. 
Satellite developers should also carefully consider 
whether the bus will be developed in-house or not.  
The increased usage of the small spacecraft in recent 
years has generated a niche industry; satellite developers 
are able to procure commercially off-the-shelf (COTS) 
products from several vendors. For example, many 
developers are obtaining their power systems from 
commercial providers (ClydeSpace, GomSpace, ISIS, 
EnduroSat, etc.). Many of these systems have extensive 
flight heritage with numerous LEO missions, and are 
specifically designed to integrate easily with many types 
of CubeSat or small satellite buses. These providers have 
teams of experienced experts and are constantly 
innovating based on feedback from customer missions. 
NanoRacks has worked closely with several of these 
companies to ensure their systems comply with human-
rated platforms. These products will often come tested 
and with all the appropriate documentation if requested.  
In NanoRacks’ experience, using a COTS system 
provides significant relief for satellite developers, 
especially newer teams with less technical capability. It 
allows developer teams to focus on the mission goal 
related to their payload and building an operational 
satellite. Generally, these systems are also more less 
likely to fail than ones developed in-house. During 
functional testing, the COTS systems are easier to 
isolate, and should an issue arise, the providers have 
troubleshooting experience and failure analysis that can 
help identify root cause. In more extreme cases where 
replacement is required, COTS parts can be re-ordered 
rather than redesigning the entire system in-house.  
NanoRacks cautions new developers attempting to build 
an entire bus in-house. If that is the goal, then plan 
accordingly. Allocate resources to dedicated teams for 
the various subsystems and stay organized. It is difficult 
to develop core subsystems and payloads all within a 
reasonable timeline. Satellite missions have been 
delayed multiple years for this very reason. Luckily, 
through a deployment platform like the ISS, re-
manifesting is more likely than a traditional expendable 
launch vehicle (ELV), for which the next available 
launch may be years away. That next launch might not 
even have the orbital parameters for which the spacecraft 
was originally designed, and mission requirements, 
including technical build and system architecture, can 
vary drastically.  
At the risk of sounding like a broken record, we strongly 
suggest new satellite developers focus on designing first 
and foremost the payload, then perhaps one or two of the 
less complicated subsystems that lend to the expertise of 
the team (such as the mechanical structure). Otherwise, 
procurement of COTS components has become very 
affordable, especially when compared to the cost of the 
hundreds of hours spent on developing systems in-house. 
While COTS systems are still susceptible to anomalies 
like all spacecraft hardware, they are generally more 
reliable than in-house solutions and will meet most 
mission criteria for new spacecraft teams.  
INHIBIT ARCHITECTURE 
An inhibit is defined as a single power interrupt that cuts 
off all power from the power system(s) on the spacecraft 
to the load (the rest of the operable systems).  
Most launch vehicles require a single inhibit to prevent 
the spacecraft from powering on. This is largely to 
address inadvertent RF transmission when integrated 
onto the vehicle; the small satellite should not interfere 
with any launch site RF systems, but more importantly 
should not interfere with the RF systems of the primary 
payload. Should the spacecraft have more hazardous 
systems, such as propulsion or large pressure vessels, 
more inhibits or further verification of the functionality 
of the inhibit(s) may be required, but those requirements 
are ultimately at the launch provider’s discretion.  
For the ISS, inhibits are one of the main requirements 
that should be addressed at the beginning of the mission 
design. The number of inhibits required are based on 
hazard classification. NOTE: Remove or Apply Before 
Flight functions do NOT qualify as inhibits. Inhibits are 
to be numerated when the spacecraft is integrated with 
the separation system or the dispenser.  
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Marginal or No Hazards 
A hazard is defined by the ISS safety standards as, “The 
presence of a potential risk situation caused by an unsafe 
act or condition.”2 Systems with marginal or no hazards 
require a single inhibit, or sometimes no inhibits. This 
means that should the spacecraft turn on, there will be no 
issues with nearby systems. In the case of satellites 
awaiting deployment, the system should probably be off 
so as not to jeopardize mission success by losing power 
or overworking the payload. However, if deemed a 
marginal hazard or no hazard at all, the state of operation 
is irrelevant.  
Critical Hazards 
Systems with a critical hazard require two inhibits. A 
critical hazard is defined as:  
Any hazard which may cause a non-disabling injury, 
severe occupational illness, loss of emergency 
procedures, or involves major damage to one of the 
following: the launch or servicing vehicle, manned base, 
an on-orbit life-sustaining function, a ground facility or 
any critical support facility.2 
Two inhibits equates to “single fault tolerance”, meaning 
that should one of the inhibits fail, the other inhibit 
continues to prevent to system from activating.  
An example of a critical hazard present on a small 
satellite on the ISS would be the presence of a transmitter 
that could potentially interfere with the communication 
link between the ISS and the ground. Similar hazards to 
human health may be associated with inadvertent 
transmission as well. 
Catastrophic Hazards 
Systems with catastrophic hazards require three inhibits, 
or dual fault tolerance. A catastrophic hazard is defined 
as, “Any hazard which causes loss of on-orbit life 
sustaining system function.2 Life sustaining systems 
include major components of the ISS infrastructure, such 
as the air filtration systems or the electrical backbone. 
These hazards are to include any danger to the crew, but 
also to all visiting vehicles. While some of these may 
seem like daunting requirements to implement, consider 
their justification. Payloads are constantly being ferried 
to and from the ISS, along with life sustaining equipment 
to keep up to six crew members on station alive and well. 
Should some of this be compromised by a small payload, 
it could result in serious consequences, and finding root 
cause can be difficult in a complicated integrated system 
like the ISS.  
Mechanical Implementation 
As defined above, an inhibit is meant to be a complete 
power interrupt that corresponds to a single mechanical 
switch. Generally, these switches are either the roller or 
the plunger types. Rollers, or auxiliary lateral inhibit 
(ALI) switches, are to be implemented on the rails of the 
satellite (should it be built for a canisterized dispenser).  
Plunger switches which are installed on the feet. Figure 
1 shows two different implementations below. 
 
Figure 1: Deployment Switch Configurations 
Some launch providers, including NanoRacks, may 
integrate multiple CubeSats into a single deployer to 
maximize volume and launch capacity. This has some 
considerations as to where to implement switches (we 
prefer rail implemented roller switches since the 
interface is better controlled), but either are acceptable 
and both have pros and cons.  
Electrical Implementation 
The electrical inhibit is supposed to cut off the entire load 
of the satellite bus from the internal power system(s) of 
the satellite. The switch can either be a FET on a board, 
or should that not be an option, the current can flow 
through an actual electromechanical switch. We advise 
caution if following the second option as the switches 
may not be rated to high currents and less reliable, but it 
is possible, and we have seen teams implement this.  
Figure 2 is what we recommend for designing inhibit 
architecture.  
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Figure 2: Electrical Inhibit Diagram 
The inhibits lie between the power system and the load 
of the satellite. Any charging that could be provided by 
the solar cells are also inhibited. D1 and D2 are 
implemented in series on the high side of the battery. The 
third inhibit, D3, is implemented on the low side of the 
battery. The presence of this ‘ground leg inhibit’ is also 
a requirement for payloads flying to the ISS that rely on 
the electrical inhibits for hazard control. This protects 
against a single internal short across the battery which 
could provide direct connection to the ground.  
On orbit, the spacecraft should not be charged until the 
spacecraft is released from the dispenser. Internal 
charging will be prevented due to the solar cells having 
no light exposure until the satellite is released into LEO, 
and the crew cannot charge the system externally prior 
to deployment in any of the current NanoRacks systems 
(this would technically be possible, however additional 
flight safety considerations would need to be accounted 
for).  
Displaying the functionality of deployment switches is 
important for two reasons: mission success and 
verification. Of course, the switch must open and close 
the circuit. If it doesn’t function, then the satellite will 
not operate after deployment. These switches are 
inexpensive, especially when compared to the other costs 
of the mission, so NanoRacks recommends purchasing 
multiple of the same type, and doing some simple 
workmanship tests before integrating on the flight 
spacecraft. Many of these switches are rated for 
thousands of cycles, so don’t be too concerned about 
overuse.  
One design complexity teams should consider to reduce 
risk to the mission is building redundancy into the inhibit 
system to eliminate the single-point failure point of each 
switch. Specifically, we have seen teams implement 3 
sets of switches in series, each set wired in parallel for a 
total of 6 switches (while still maintaining 3 independent 
inhibits). While this adds complexity to the design, it can 
seriously reduce the risk of a five-dollar switch ending a 
million dollar program.  
Besides mission success, displaying switch and inhibit 
functionality during or after environmental testing may 
be required. While this may seem obvious, formalizing 
their operation may be needed to show proper hazard 
control. If the inhibits, and therefore switches, are 
controlling a major RF hazard (high power output or 
sensitive frequency ranges) then a control for that hazard 
is showing the system is not operating. When submitting 
ISS safety verification, a Certificate of Conformance 
(CoC) or Record of Assembly (ROA) concluding the 
system is unpowered when integrated into the dispenser 
will likely be needed.  
We recommend baselining a three inhibit approach to 
any system. While none of the systems onboard may be  
considered hazardous, implementing dual fault tolerance 
is the best method to account for any safety issues that 
could arise during the flight safety approval process and 
can reduce major changes late in the project lifecycle. 
Many COTS electronic power system (EPS) providers 
offer a “manned-rated” version of their power systems. 
These should include the proper inhibit architecture as 
well as proper circuit protection for the batteries (see 
EPS section). If designing the EPS is not in the scope of 
the mission, then we highly recommend purchasing one 
of these systems.  
UNIQUE SUBSYSTEMS 
After determining the scope of the mission, one of the 
payloads on the spacecraft may end up being classified 
as a “unique” subsystem. Several types of unique 
subsystems are discussed below, but any component 
beyond typical subsystems (EPS, ADCS, etc.) can be 
considered “unique”. Based on the mission science 
objectives, these payloads can be complicated, such as a 
pressure vessels or propulsion systems. The following 
sections outline several unique systems that NanoRacks 
has encountered.  
Pressure Vessels 
A pressure vessel is defined by NASA as a hermetically 
sealed system that is pressurized to 100psia or greater3. 
Hermetically sealed means that its internal pressure will 
not vary greatly (ignoring ideal gas law) when exposed 
to a vacuum; i.e. a mechanical forcing function is needed 
to cause any pressure changes. When flying a pressure 
vessel, several aspects should be considered, including 
design, manufacturing process, and acceptance testing.  
The developer should first consider if the pressure vessel 
can be procured off the shelf. Because hardware is 
launched as pressurized cargo to the ISS, the spacecraft 
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will inevitably be traveling on United States highways 
and roads, meaning the vessel must be Department of 
Transportation (DOT) certified. If building the tank in-
house, DOT requirements must be met.  
Additionally, many systems procured off the shelf will 
have had leak testing, destructive testing, and assembly 
records. These processes save a lot of work for 
developers with limited budgets and resources. This 
paperwork will have to be produced as verification for 
flight safety compliance, therefore it’s good to have on 
hand. It also avoids developing unique test plans for the 
pressure vessel, further reducing the mission test regime.  
NanoRacks has recently seen many payload developers 
looking to utilize new types of pressure vessels with 
unique materials or cutting-edge manufacturing methods 
(such as additive manufacturing). While these are 
interesting technology developments, teams need to 
ensure not to underestimate the analysis and test 
requirements that will be levied to be compliant with 
DOT and NASA flight safety requirements. These will 
include testing such as destructive burst tests and a lot of 
additional paperwork such as manufacturing records, 
material certifications, etc. While not impossible, this 
needs to be budgeted for in advance if looking to qualify 
a system such as this for manned flight.  
Propulsion 
Propulsion is a sensitive topic for payloads flying to a 
manned station. Propulsion can pose a legitimate threat 
to the crew, life sustaining equipment, visiting vehicles, 
and other critical space assets, and therefore is extremely 
scrutinized. It can be difficult to get full approval of a 
propulsion system, and in many cases, fundamental 
changes will be levied to become more compliant with 
manned spaceflight requirements. The review process 
will be extensive and often requires several meetings to 
explore failure scenarios and outlying cases. The 
developer should be prepared to produce analyses, write 
reports, have organized paperwork, and be willing to 
make design changes.  
The work required for a propulsion system can be 
intimidating, and some developers simply do not have 
the ability to support a propulsion system through the 
safety approval process. That’s okay; if it’s an 
experimental system with little or no flight heritage, 
flying on manned spaceflight missions is probably not 
the right choice anyway, and an ELV opportunity should 
be explored instead. Even if it is a system with heritage, 
it still may not be a good match. If the goal is to achieve 
orbit or plane changes, then high delta-v systems are 
probably non-starters, or systems with highly toxic 
propellants (hydrazine) are likely not going to be 
compliant when used on a small spacecraft that comes 
near astronauts. However, the opportunities for safety 
approval are much higher for systems simply used for 
attitude control or station keeping.  
Two major areas must be considered if the satellite is 
flying as pressurized cargo: traversing through the 
inhabited volume of the station, and post deployment 
operations in LEO.  
When traversing through the internal volume of the ISS, 
the system will need to remain inhibited. The three 
mechanical/electrical inhibit approach will work when 
the satellite is still in the dispenser or attached to the 
separation ring for any electric propulsion system. The 
propellant must also be considered. Toxic substances 
must have proper levels of containment and redundancy 
in the seals / valves. Given the high delta-v nature of a 
monopropellant system, it’s unlikely it would be 
approved by the safety process for most small satellites, 
but if it were, a highly toxic chemical such as hydrogen 
peroxide would need multiple levels of containment, and 
therefore would be very difficult to control. In the case 
of a lower delta-v system, non-combustibles may be 
acceptable. In our experience, even if the propellant is 
not a toxic material or is properly contained, the 
environmental filters on the ISS may not be able to 
accommodate certain types; therefore, before selecting a 
propulsion system, material compatibility should be 
considered.  
As mentioned earlier, post-deployment considerations 
also come into play. All items jettisoned from the ISS 
must be analyzed for potential recontact. Ultimately, the 
maximum delta-v of the system in a single worst-case 
failure should be investigated. This analysis explores 
how much delta-v can be expelled when the system fails 
and stays in the “on” position. Some questions that the 
safety process often asks are: Can the system expel all its 
delta-v at once? What are the physical limits of the 
system (power budget, software timer, thermal 
conditions)? These questions will need to be answered 
during safety review meetings, and in some cases, 
analyses will need to be produced to verify those 
answers.  
It should be noted that truly redundant post-deployment 
inhibits are challenging to implement for most small 
satellite teams due to the strict requirements of the ISS 
Program with respect to electrical requirements and 
Computer Based Control Systems (CBCS) standards. 
Effectively, it is near impossible to convince the ISS 
Program that any inhibits are redundant on an 
operational system unless they are completely isolated 
and controlled by independent processors. While there is 
a way to meet all post-deployment requirements and 
design a high dv propulsion system capable of 
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completing proximity operations with the ISS, 
NanoRacks has yet to work with a small satellite team 
willing to invest the time and resources required to do so. 
Therefore, the small satellite systems that have flown to 
ISS to date were approved based on limited capabilities 
that resulted in an extremely low risk of recontact to ISS.  
Each propulsion system is looked at on a case by case 
basis, so NanoRacks recommends working closely with 
the mission management staff early in the development 
stage. Avionics and system architecture are also critical 
for compliance but are not covered in this paper.  
High Power Transmitters 
Experimental communications payloads are becoming 
more common on small spacecraft. Generally, the bus 
size offers enough room to work with capable 
communications systems in LEO, and these systems are 
often less expensive to build. From a safety standpoint, a 
potential Radio Frequency (RF) hazard is one of the main 
considerations for every spacecraft. RF hazards can be 
separated into two parts: potential human health dangers 
for the crew and interference with critical station assets.  
Fortunately, brief calculations can determine the 
potential for RF hazards; this assessment relies on the 
center frequency, antenna gain, and maximum power 
output of the transmitter. NanoRacks recommends 
working with the mission management staff early in the 
payload design phase to address these concerns.  
Deployable Appendages 
A deployable component is defined as anything that can 
be released to extend beyond the nominal envelope of the 
spacecraft. A common example of deployable 
appendages are solar arrays, which can be seen in Figure 
3. Deployables are perfectly acceptable to use, but some 
considerations should be made.  
One of NanoRacks’ main concerns with deployables is 
to show that any potential “hang fire” is not credible. A 
hang fire occurs when the deployable appendage catches 
on part of the dispenser and the satellite does not 
completely deploy. These situations are important to 
address, because a hang fire is an indeterminate system. 
On an ELV, hang fires might not be as important. The 
primary payload has either already deployed, or the 
secondaries are integrated in a way that is relatively 
independent of the primary. On a manned platform, 
however, a potential collision scenario with visiting 
vehicles, robotic and EVA activity, or other types of 
hosted payloads and life sustaining equipment is a 
catastrophic hazard and is simply unacceptable. 
Dispensers are generally designed to prevent hang fires 
by utilizing smoothbore walls and step-down interfaces, 
but these aspects do not totally mitigate the potential for 
a hang fire.  
 
Figure 3: Example Body-mounted Arrays12 
In order to fully disprove the possibility of a hang fire, 
NanoRacks recommends and often times requires a pull-
through test with our deployer and an engineering model 
of the satellite. It is a simple test which can be performed 
at various stages throughout the integration or testing 
phases. In our experience, pull-through testing provides 
great risk mitigation and can reduce scrutiny of retention 
mechanisms. NanoRacks recommends redundant 
systems to prevent inadvertent release; however, we 
understand the potential threat to mission success by 
having more than one burn wire or physical switch. 
Therefore, analysis or physical tests are the best way to 
show deployables are not a cause for concern.  
Lasers 
Lasers offer a wide range of uses on a small spacecraft. 
In particular, NanoRacks is seeing more and more small 
satellites looking to demonstrate optical communications 
and other interesting capabilities like laser range finding.  
If the laser is inhibited when close to crew members on 
the ISS, there isn’t much cause for concern. Table 1 
shows most of the information that should be provided 
when flying to a manned platform.  
Table 1: Example Laser Specifications 
System Property Example Response 
Type of laser Er doped silica fiber 
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Class of laser Class IV 
Lasing material Er 
CW or pulsed pulsed 
Wavelength 487 nanometers 
Bandwidth 50 MHz to 1 GHz 
Energy per pulse .7 uJ/pulse at 50 MHz 
Pulse duration 250 nanosecond at 50 MHz 
Pulse rate 50 MHz to 200 MHz 
Max duty cycle 50% 
Avg Power output @ duty rate 10W 
Beam divergence at 1/e point 12 milliradians 
Emergent beam diameter 0.1 mm 
Voltage of system 8.4 V 
Electrical power consumed 20W 
The above information can be used to classify the laser 
and determine the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance 
(NOHD). This defines the hazard classification and the 
associated required inhibits while in proximity of the 
ISS. 
Coordination to operate the laser should be done with the 
DoD Laser Clearinghouse to ensure legal and safe 
operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
also has applicable commercial standards. Operating 
within a certain vicinity of other vehicles in orbit should 
be defined and avoided when necessary. Remember, 
being a good steward of space is important for achieving 
long term goals.  
POWER SYSTEMS 
One of the most critical subsystems in any spacecraft is 
the Electronic Power System (EPS), as this drives the 
functionality of the payload and all other major 
subsystems. While the most obvious design driver for the 
power system is performance and capacity relative to the 
predicted power budget, there are several other critical 
factors to consider when flying to a manned platform 
such as the ISS. This section will focus primarily on 
design considerations, test requirements, and lessons 
learned from qualifying small satellite scaled power 
systems for flight to the ISS.  
COTS vs. Custom EPS    
As discussed earlier, one of the first things to consider 
when designing a spacecraft is determining what 
subsystems will be procured commercially off the shelf 
(COTS) and what will be developed in-house; this is no 
different for the EPS. There are a wide variety of 
commercial vendors that provide power systems for 
small satellites, ranging in price, performance, and 
compliance with manned spacecraft requirements. There 
are numerous drivers that influence the decision of 
whether to procure a COTS power system vs. develop an 
in-house solution, including budget, schedule, reliability, 
performance, and of course compliance with flight safety 
requirements of the launch vehicle (LV). So long as there 
is a system on the market that meets the technical 
requirements of the satellite in design and the budget can 
support the procurement of a COTS system, it is almost 
certainly going to present less technical and schedule risk 
to simply buy a power system than try to develop one in-
house. This is particularly true for first-time satellite 
developers with less experience than more experienced 
teams with heritage components on other spacecraft.  
Vendor Selection for COTS Components  
The small satellite vendor market has grown 
dramatically in recent years, giving the consumer a wide 
variety of options when shopping for subsystems such as 
an EPS. As the number of providers has increased, it’s 
critical to carefully consider the different COTS options. 
While some subsystems may have impressive 
performance characteristics, it’s important to weigh 
other factors such as flight heritage when selecting a 
system. One selection criteria that can’t be ignored is 
compliance with flight safety requirements. There are a 
wide number of power systems on the market that may 
claim to be compliant with manned spaceflight 
platforms. Prior to making the purchase, work with the 
launch provider to ensure that is the case. NanoRacks has 
spent a significant amount of effort working with 
commercial EPS providers to ensure their systems 
adhere to manned spaceflight design & test requirements 
and can help educate teams during the selection process.  
Cell Selection Criteria  
If developing an EPS in-house, perhaps the first design 
consideration is the type of cell. Nearly all small 
satellites are now utilizing Lithium-ion or Lithium-ion 
polymer cells due to their excellent technical 
specifications such as high energy density, efficiency, 
and long lifetime.6 The nominal voltage of Li-ion cells is 
approximately 3.6V but the capacity of the cells can vary 
depending on the size / form-factor and cell chemistry.3 
Apart from the performance characteristics and capacity, 
there are other critical design factors to consider when 
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selecting cells related to manned spacecraft flight safety 
requirements.  
The first major item to consider is the cell chemistry and 
toxicity of the liquid electrolyte. For example, cells with 
an electrolyte toxicity hazard level (THL) 4 should not 
be used in a habitable space environment per current ISS 
requirements.3  Examples of such cell chemistries include 
lithium-sulfur dioxide, lithium-sulfuryl chloride, 
lithium-thionyl chloride, and Li-BCX. 3 Carefully review 
the toxicity of the cells to ensure compliance to a manned 
platform as these toxic cell chemistries are common in 
other industries.  
For example, NanoRacks has had to require a team 
utilizing a small coin cell with lithium-thionyl chloride 
chemistry to swap out their cell for a less toxic 
alternative. Fortunately, there are many Li-ion cell 
chemistries on the market that are less hazardous 
(typically THL-2) that are acceptable in space 
applications for flight on manned platforms. Examples 
of acceptable cell chemistries include lithium manganese 
dioxide and lithium iron phosphate (among others).3   
Another factor to consider with respect to flight safety 
requirements when selecting a cell type is protection 
circuitry. Any cell in a power system that flies to a 
manned platform requires some form of circuitry to 
protect against potential strain that could cause a 
hazardous event. The three major types of protection 
circuitry required for Li-ion and Li-ion polymer cells 
used in small satellite applications on the ISS are 
outlined below:3 
• Over-charge protection circuitry 
• Over-discharge protection circuitry 
• External short protection circuitry 
The required protection circuitry can technically be 
implemented either at the cell level or at the battery pack 
level. Regardless of the implementation approach, it is 
critical when choosing the cell to understand the 
protection circuitry that is inherent at the cell level. In 
many cases, this will drive the flight certification test 
protocol and protection circuitry design of the EPS, so it 
cannot be overlooked.  
Cell / Battery Test Requirements  
NanoRacks has spent a significant amount of effort 
working with the Johnson Space Center (JSC) 
Propulsion and Power Division to refine the battery test 
requirements for Li-ion and Li-ion polymer cells used in 
small satellite applications on the ISS. When NanoRacks 
began facilitating launch of small satellites to the ISS in 
2013, the test requirements for Li-ion cells were 
extremely intensive and it was not practical for most 
CubeSat teams to complete. While refining the test 
requirements is still a work in progress, NanoRacks has 
developed a statement of work based on the available 
JSC documents and several working groups with the JSC 
Battery Group that is much more reasonable for payload 
developers across all levels of expertise to complete.  
Although the test requirements are well defined, there are 
still many lessons learned from previous test campaigns 
that can be passed along to future small satellite teams. 
First, there is a common misconception of what the intent 
of the battery testing is. Often teams view these as 
environmental tests, when in fact the suite of testing is 
really designed as workmanship tests to verify designed 
protection schemes and screen the cells / batteries for 
manufacturer defects that could lead to a hazardous event 
(such as electrolyte leakage or thermal runaway).3 For 
example, the flight acceptance vibration test may not 
necessarily serve as the battery vibration test. 
The Li-ion and Li-ion polymer cell / battery test 
requirements consists of the following major tests / 
procedures:7 
• Measurement of Physical Properties  
• Baseline of Electrochemical Characteristics  
• Charge Cycling  
• Over-Charge Test 
• Over-Discharge Test 
• External Short Test 
• Vibration Test 
• Vacuum Test  
• Thermal Runaway Propagation Test (if 
required) 
The majority of lessons learned associated with the 
required testing is due to a lack of understanding of what 
tests can be done at the cell vs. battery pack level, and 
what testing can be done as qualification testing vs. 
acceptance testing. Technically all these tests could be 
conducted at the cell level if the appropriate protection 
circuitry is in place. However, cell-level protection 
circuitry is often non-resettable or subject to failure 
beyond the first instance of operation, resulting in most 
teams implementing some form of battery-pack level 
protection.  
For the over-charge, over-discharge, and external short 
testing, NanoRacks recommends testing the protection 
circuitry that will be in place on the flight system 
(whether that be at the cell or the pack level). Should the 
protection circuitry that will be relied upon during flight 
be at the cell level, a qualification test approach is most 
appropriate (where the tested cells are certified from the 
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same lot as the flight cells that are not subjected to the 
protection circuitry tests).  
While some tests may be conducted on flight equivalent 
cells from the same lot, note that lot traceability can be 
difficult to verify especially when procuring cells from 
an online vendor or reseller. It is recommended that cells 
be procured directly from the manufacturer when 
possible, otherwise a qualification test approach may not 
be possible due to the fact lot traceability cannot be 
verified.  
Besides the protection circuitry tests, the majority of the 
testing must be conducted on the flight cells (such as the 
charge cycling, vibe, and vacuum for example). This 
testing can be performed at the cell or the battery level, 
except for one of the electrochemical characterizations: 
the 14 Day Open Circuit Voltage (OCV) test. This test 
requires the OCV to be monitored incrementally 
throughout a 14-day period to detect for declining 
voltage in the cell.7 One of the lessons learned from 
previous testing is that this test cannot be performed at 
the pack level. Even if the pass-fail criterion of declining 
voltage is scaled based on the quantity of cells, there is 
no way to isolate a failure in any one cell in the pack. 
Therefore, this test should be performed on all cells prior 
to pack assembly should the remainder of the testing be 
performed at the pack level.  
As with any flight safety testing, NanoRacks 
recommends the launch service provider review all test 
plans prior to starting testing to avoid any unnecessary 
mistakes during test that may cause delays in schedule 
and increased cost.  
Thermal Runaway Propagation  
One of the flight safety considerations for Li-ion and Li-
ion polymer cells is the risk of thermal runaway 
propagation. Thermal runaway is defined by JSC as, 
a condition whereby a cell or battery overheats and 
reaches very high temperatures in very short periods 
(i.e., seconds) through internal heat generation caused 
by an internal short or due to an abusive condition.3  
While the risk of a spontaneous internal short can never 
be completely eliminated in a single cell, so long as the 
toxicity of the vented gasses is below a given threshold 
and the flammability of the surrounding materials is 
limited, the safety hazard can be controlled. The major 
concern for manned space platforms with respect to 
thermal runaway is cell-to-cell propagation should a 
single cell enter a runaway event. The ISS Program has 
selected a total battery energy of 80Wh as a strict 
threshold at which thermal runaway propagation testing 
is required.3 To date, the vast majority of CubeSat power 
systems that NanoRacks has processed have been below 
the 80Wh threshold.  
Despite the fact thermal runaway propagation tests are 
not always required, NanoRacks does have extensive 
experience in the qualification process for Li-ion battery 
packs greater than 80Wh.  
The largest battery NanoRacks has supported through the 
qualification process for flight to the ISS to date is 
approximately 480Wh. For systems with this much 
energy, there is no way to avoid having to complete 
multiple destructive thermal runaway tests to show that 
the battery pack is designed to effectively prohibit cell-
to-cell propagation. Unfortunately, there is no generic 
approved thermal runaway test plan, so the exact test 
protocol is still handled on a case-by-case basis with the 
JSC Battery Group when qualifying systems for flight to 
the ISS.  
Even though there is no approved test plan for thermal 
runaway testing, there are still several design 
considerations and lessons learned with respect to 
designing compliant systems with manned spacecraft 
requirements. For example, understanding the cell vent 
path is critical when designing the battery enclosure to 
ensure that if a single cell enters thermal runaway, it will 
not immediately trigger adjacent cells. Depending on the 
cell design, it may be necessary to add additional 
structure and heat sinks around each cell to mitigate 
against cell-to-cell propagation. This is critical to 
consider when budgeting the total spacecraft mass and 
the volume of the EPS.  
If mass is a major design driver, it’s possible thermal 
runaway mitigation may end up being a critical design 
driver in the power system with respect to cell selection. 
For example, 18650 cylindrical Li-ion cells have a much 
more predictable vent path than Li-ion pouch cells, 
which may be beneficial when designing a system that 
prohibits cell-to-cell propagation.  
NanoRacks has additional lessons learned when 
qualifying power systems above 80Wh, based 
specifically on the current battery test requirements of 
the ISS Program. While not all of these can be detailed 
in this paper, one recommendation based on experience 
when designing power systems above 80Wh is to keep 
individual battery packs below the 80Wh threshold and 
otherwise electrically and physically isolate these packs 
within the spacecraft bus. Of course, in CubeSats and 
other small satellite platforms, physically isolating 
battery packs can be challenging but it may be necessary 
in order to avoid extensive thermal runaway testing. Any 
destructive testing with a challenging pass / fail criterion 
such as cell-to-cell propagation adds cost, schedule, and 
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risk to any spacecraft qualification program and should 
be avoided if possible.  
Ultimately, there are many design considerations and 
significant testing that go into developing and qualifying 
an electronic power system that is compliant with 
manned spaceflight requirements. This inevitably 
introduces additional schedule and cost that must be 
budgeted for when planning to develop and qualify a 
spacecraft for flight to a platform such as the ISS. To 
mitigate this impact, it is recommended that less 
experienced developers procure a COTS EPS with flight 
heritage on manned platforms. Regardless of whether the 
power system is procured commercially or developed in 
house, it is good practice for teams to engage early and 
often with their launch service provider such as 
NanoRacks to ensure that the design and test plan is 
compliant with all requirements and safe for flight.   
MATERIALS SELECTION & USAGE 
Due to recent increases in commercial spacecraft 
component providers, small satellite developers are now 
able to focus on mission design by purchasing COTS 
hardware. While these systems are selected for their 
application to the satellite’s goals, they are sometimes 
made of materials that do not respond well to the space 
environment. To reduce significant re-work for materials 
noncompliance, NanoRacks recommends adhering to the 
guidance outlined in this section.     
Outgassing and Contamination 
One of the main materials selection concerns for most 
spacecraft is outgassing, which is the release of gases and 
particulates when the satellite is exposed to a vacuum 
environment. These released gasses have the potential to 
contact other satellites and re-condense on critical 
systems. For example, an epoxy might outgas onto 
another spacecraft’s optical components, potentially 
obscuring valuable data.4 Since the ISS must be able to 
support human life at all times, outgassing prevention is 
especially important for satellites deployed by 
NanoRacks. 
Typically, if a high-outgassing material must be used for 
satellite components, a thermal vacuum bake-out test is 
required prior to flight. In lieu of this test, an audit of the 
materials used on the spacecraft is performed to find bad 
actors, and in some cases, a formal analysis is performed 
to assess contamination levels. This analysis requires a 
list of all non-metallic materials utilized in the spacecraft 
and the corresponding surface areas of those materials. 
The baseline requirements for the materials list are based 
on two outgassing properties: Total Mass Loss (TML) 
and Collected Volatile Condensable Material (CVCM). 
The general NASA standard is to require a TML of ≤ 1% 
and CVCM of ≤ 0.1%. Note, this is not necessarily a 
requirement by ISS Program and all materials being 
exposed to the external environment are subjected to 
review.  
Once the satellite developer has determined an initial 
components list, NanoRacks recommends referencing 
the TML and CVCM data of all materials on 
outgassing.nasa.gov. If the material is below the required 
levels, in general it will be acceptable especially in 
satellites that will not spend much time outside the ISS 
prior to deployment; if the TML or CVCM values are 
only slightly exceeding, contact NanoRacks for 
additional evaluation. TML/CVCM levels much higher 
than the requirements should be carefully considered 
before use, due to the potential for rejection by the ISS 
Space Environments Group.  
The NASA outgassing database is extensive and should 
provide developers a baseline for materials selection; 
however, NanoRacks’ several years of experience have 
revealed certain materials to carefully consider before 
use. One of these materials is polyvinyl chloride (PVC). 
PVC is sometimes used in COTS ribbon cables or 
connectors, but typically has very high TML and CVCM 
levels. If a developer must use PVC in a satellite 
deployed from the ISS, NanoRacks advises that the PVC 
components might be rejected or require additional 
containment (hermetically sealed or covered with a 
conformal coat or Kapton tape).  
Toxic Material Containment  
Since the ISS is a human-occupied platform, numerous 
precautions are taken to ensure the safety and well-being 
of the inhabitants. These precautions include preventing 
any toxic material from interacting with the astronauts. 
The NASA document “Guidelines for Assessing the 
Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test 
Materials” characterizes the Toxicological Hazard 
Levels (THL) associated with certain materials.8  
Table 1 on page 3 of the above document describes the 
hazards associated with each toxicity level. These hazard 
levels correspond to the degrees of containment required 
while the material is inside the ISS. For example, a THL-
1 material must have two separate methods of 
containment. These containment levels could be 
achieved by hermetically sealing the material in a 
container, then surrounding the container with a payload 
enclosure. Materials such as refrigerants and thruster 
propellants often receive high scrutiny from the ISS 
Safety Review Panel; implementing proper containment 
levels typically alleviates any concerns. NanoRacks 
safety engineers have collaborated with several satellite 
developers to successfully design a containment system 
that adheres to ISS Program requirements.  
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Re-entry Survivability 
The average small satellite in low Earth orbit has a 
relatively short orbital lifetime due to its low mass 
relative to projected surface area. This diminutive size 
also results in the entirety of the spacecraft burning up as 
it re-enters Earth’s atmosphere. However, any small 
satellite with a mass greater than 5 kg is required by the 
ISS Program to submit an Orbital Debris Assessment 
Report (ODAR) to the ISS Program Trajectory 
Operations Office (TOPO) for jettison assessment. This 
assessment identifies any spacecraft components likely 
to survive re-entry and implements a probabilistic model 
to determine the potential for human casualty on the 
ground.      
While the ODAR and many of the other materials 
selection criteria are levied by NASA requirements, the 
FCC also analyzes spacecraft materials re-entering the 
Earth’s atmosphere for domestic spacecraft requiring 
FCC licenses. The FCC relies on a standardized limit for 
all orbital re-entries: components returning to Earth 
should impart less than 15 Joules of energy to any point 
of impact on the ground. In NanoRacks’ experience, 
materials with high melting points, like titanium, often 
get approved through the NASA debris analysis, but 
cannot gain FCC permission due to re-entry energies 
greater than 15 Joules. To mitigate debris analysis 
concerns, coordinate with NanoRacks early in the design 
process if any high melting point materials are being 
considered.   
Off-gassing Considerations  
The vacuum environment of space causes outgassing in 
certain materials (as outlined above), but some materials 
also off-gas in a pressurized environment. Off-gassing is 
often described as “the new car smell” and is the result 
of materials releasing chemicals in an enclosed area. The 
ISS is especially susceptible to off-gassing, since the 
released materials cannot easily be vented out of the 
station. If the payload developer plans to use high off-
gassing materials, testing according to NASA-STD-
6001A might be required.   
Spacecraft Materials Testing 
If materials are not contained in a NASA database or 
have the potential to violate ISS Program requirements, 
additional testing is sometimes necessary. These tests 
include American Society for Testing and Materials 
(ASTM) E595 and E1559.  
ASTM E595 
ASTM E595 testing determines a material’s TML and 
CVCM, so it typically is only necessary when a material 
is not contained in the NASA outgassing database. To 
determine how the material will react in a vacuum 
environment, a test specimen is placed in a thermal 
vacuum chamber for 24 hours. The material is heated to 
125° C and allowed to condense on a collector at 25° C.9  
ASTM E1559 
While E595 measures the amount of mass that outgasses 
in a vacuum environment, ASTM E1559 tests the kinetic 
interactions of particles discharged from a spacecraft.10 
If a material cannot be found in the NASA outgassing 
database and the results of ASTM E595 are inconclusive, 
ASTM E1559 must be conducted before the material can 
be approved.  
ENVIRONMENTAL & VIBRATION TESTING 
Environmental testing is one of the major phases of 
spacecraft development and can occupy a significant part 
of the ground phase of the satellite’s life. The importance 
of environmental testing should not be understated, as it 
is a true indicator if a spacecraft is prepared for launch 
and on-orbit operations. Extensive test plans should be 
developed early in the mission lifecycle and revised as 
the project grows. Testing should be a combination of 
mission success criteria and launch provider 
requirements.  
Launch Vehicle (LV) test requirements should be 
considered non-negotiable. Unless there is a waiver 
process outlined, write LV requirements into the test plan 
and prepare to follow through. The principle “test like 
you fly” should be adhered to as closely as possible; 
when deviation is necessary, the testing sub-team should 
substantiate the difference with technical rationale.  
In addition to LV requirements, there are qualification 
and flight acceptance tests. As discussed in the Power 
Systems section of this paper, qualification means the 
tests can be done on a non-flight but flight-identical 
article. For example, if shock testing is a qualification 
test but not flight acceptance, then the designated shock 
procedure can be performed on the engineering model of 
the spacecraft, if available. Flight acceptance means it 
must be performed on the flight article. Usually flight 
acceptance tests occur near the end of the entire test 
regime, because there should be little to no configuration 
changes afterward.  
NanoRacks has worked hard to outline requirements that 
cover all potential ISS resupply missions and have made 
testing as minimal as possible for payload developers. 
Should a mission to a manned platform slip, then re-
manifesting on a similar vehicle is possible with little to 
no changes (common launch requirements).  
It should be noted that there is a tremendous amount of 
other spacecraft testing not discussed in this section or 
this paper. NanoRacks recommends engaging with the 
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small satellite community and reading NASA GEVS 
thoroughly to properly test a small spacecraft. It is 
understood that many teams do not have the budget for 
an engineering model, so additional margin should be 
built into the design if completing a protoflight test 
campaign as there is no room for error. This is not 
recommended if it can be avoided.   
Random Vibration 
One major requirement across all launch vehicles, 
including to the ISS, is random vibration testing. It 
generally consists of a 60 second vibration test in all 
three axes for flight acceptance. Sine sweeps, performed 
before and after test runs to identify the fundamental 
modes of the spacecraft, are optional to perform, but 
highly recommended as this can identify major structural 
issues that may not be noticed during visual inspections. 
Random vibration is generally performed as a hard-
mount test; when flying as internal cargo, there is the 
option to “test like you fly”, which involves layering the 
spacecraft in bubble wrap and foam during the vibration 
test to simulate the launch environment.  
This test should be worked closely with the launch 
provider, but it usually provides significantly less strain 
on the vehicle. Table 2 shows hard-mount and soft-stow 
profiles compared to one another. Soft-stow absorbs a lot 
of the energy and can be beneficial to sensitive payloads 
like imagers. The third test in Table 2 is the NASA 
GEVS workmanship vibration profile.11 The 
workmanship vibration is meant to identify 
workmanship flaws, like an un-torqued or un-staked 
fastener, or issues with structure.  
Table 2: Vibration Level Comparisons 
 
It is highly recommended to perform a workmanship test 
due to its targeted nature; however, it is not a requirement 
for satellites launched as ISS cargo inside of the 
NanoRacks CubeSat deployer so long as other measures 
are taken to verify hardware configuration post-test.  
EMI/EMC Testing 
EMI/EMC testing is generally not a requirement for 
flying small satellites as pressurized cargo to the ISS. 
The payloads are quiescent during launch and stowage 
until deployment, and the standard spacecraft 30-minute 
post-deployment timer is a good catch-all for RF 
interference. Should the payload need to operate 
immediately after deployment, potential radiated or 
conducted emissions testing can be performed; however, 
this is usually determined on a case by case basis. 
Thermal Vacuum Testing 
Thermal Vacuum (TVAC) testing is a critical part of the 
ground segment for a spacecraft. It is the closest 
representation to the environment the satellite will 
operate in and pushes the satellite’s subsystems to their 
limits. TVAC is not usually a mission requirement (in 
special cases of materials usage it might be), but TVAC 
should not be overlooked. TVAC testing is crucial to 
verifying the spacecraft performs as expected, but it 
should also not be scheduled at the end of the testing 
regime.  
In NanoRacks’ experience, developers generally plan 
this test last and too close to hardware delivery; TVAC 
often discovers several problems that can require entire 
subsystem redesign. Developers should perform TVAC 
tests on subsystems individually when possible and plan 
appropriate schedule for troubleshooting problems when 
they inevitably surface.  
At some point, it may be necessary to weigh mission 
success versus hardware delivery. Re-manifesting may 
not always be an option for satellite developers, 
especially when manifested on a more traditional ELV; 
therefore, hardware delivery deadlines should be 
prioritized. Ensure the flight acceptance tests levied by 
the launch provider have been completed, then perform 
a basic risk assessment for delivering a potentially 
“undertested” spacecraft. Most satellite developers will 
say that a spacecraft could always use more testing, but 
at some point, it needs to leave the laboratory. Especially 
for newer teams, even if the spacecraft does not work 
perfectly on-orbit, there is a tremendous amount to learn 
from building a spacecraft and getting it to orbit. 
REGULATORY LICENSING 
While regulatory licensing can be difficult to navigate 
for small satellite developers, it is arguably one of the 
most important requirements to satisfy and is a mission 
killer without. What licenses does your spacecraft need? 
When should the process begin? For some small 
satellites, regulatory licensing can become neglected, 
coming down to the wire for when it’s needed, and result 
in de-manifestation of your spacecraft. This risk, 
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however, can be properly mitigated through pro-activity 
and proper guidance. 
NOAA Licensing 
Any private space-based remote sensing system (i.e. 
scanning the Earth to obtain data, taking 
photographs/videos, etc.) requires licensing. The 
responsibility to issue these licenses has been delegated 
by the Secretary of Commerce to the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). To determine 
if your satellite needs a NOAA license, you should fill 
out NOAA’s “initial contact form”, which consists of a 
brief description of the mission objectives and 
operations. The form is a simple Google doc 
questionnaire that takes roughly 10 minutes to fill out 
(https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/CRSRA/generalApplicati
on.html). After filling out this form, NOAA will either 
provide a memo indicating that no license is needed, or 
seek more information about your system before 
providing a license. This is an important pre-requisite to 
receiving an FCC license, as the FCC will usually ask for 
evidence of coordination with NOAA to be submitted as 
an exhibit.  
FCC Licensing 
There are three FCC licensing paths that we commonly 
see for domestic non-government spacecraft: Part 5 
Experimental, Part 25 Commercial, or Part 97 Amateur. 
With any path, it is generally recommended that 
licensing is filed within 30 days of launch vehicle 
selection/manifesting, and around 9 months to a year 
prior to final delivery. Small satellites with unique radio 
ConOps, or operation in governmental bands that will 
require additional coordination efforts, should allow 
more time for regulatory approval. Below are things 
we’ve seen with each of the FCC licensing paths: 
Experimental 
An experimental radio service, per 47 CFR Ch. 1, is “a 
service in which radio waves are employed for the 
purposes of experimentation”. We see many teams use 
this licensing approach, as many small satellites seek to 
demonstrate technology or perform some type of 
experiment. If the operational lifetime of the satellite is 
less than 6 months, payload developers can pursue a 
Special Temporary Authorization (STA). Developers 
with a longer duration of experimentation should file for 
a regular experimental license using FCC form 442. 
Many of our developers seek the regular experimental 
license, as they are on-orbit for at least 1-2 years.  
Amateur 
An amateur service, defined by the FCC, is “a radio-
communication service for the purpose of self-training, 
intercommunication and technical investigations carried 
about by amateurs…without pecuniary interest”. 
Deciphered, this means that an amateur operator 
shouldn’t have a financial interest in the system. What 
we’ve seen recently, however, is that developers seeking 
amateur licenses need to be purely amateur; meaning no 
government, university, or other stakeholders (including 
commercial) should be invested in the project.  
As of recent, there has been plenty of confusion in the 
small satellite community about how to navigate 
between amateur and experimental licensing. In the past, 
payload developers have utilized the International 
Amateur Radio Union (IARU) to coordinate frequencies 
for their spacecraft. However, the IARU seems to have 
stopped coordinating amateur frequencies for those 
seeking experimental licenses with the FCC, meaning 
payload developers are having to coordinate frequencies 
for themselves. This coordination can prove to be 
daunting, as the available frequency bands for space-to-
earth transceiving are limited and can be quite congested. 
In fact, sometimes teams are asked to produce 
electromagnetic compatibility analyses to determine 
what interference their system might have with other 
active satellites. As processes have changed, many small 
satellite developers have started to seek guidance from 
consultants, or other satellite developers who have 
navigated these waters in the past. 
Commercial 
Few small satellite systems have used this licensing path 
in the past, however, as technology is refined and new 
business plans arise, this approach has become more 
common. We typically see this path as almost 
exclusively used by commercial companies that seek to 
generate revenue with their satellite(s).  
Special Licensing Conditions 
It is important to be aware of the special conditions stated 
on your FCC license. Common conditions that we’ve 
noticed within FCC licenses include being proactive 
about collision risk mitigation, operating on a non-
interference basis, and notifying regulatory bodies when 
the satellite transmissions commence and terminate.  
Note: To help understand and mitigate collision risks, get 
in touch with the 18th Space Control Squadron 
(previously known as JSpOC) a couple months prior to 
launch. They will set you up with a Space-Track account 
to retrieve orbital data and conjunction assessments. 
Manned Station Requirements 
One nuance that comes into play when adhering to 
manned spaceflight requirements, is determining how 
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your small satellite’s RF operations might interfere with 
the ISS. After collecting the technical specifications of 
your radio(s), the Johnson Space Center Spectrum Office 
performs a radio frequency compatibility analysis to 
determine if there is any interference with critical ISS or 
visiting vehicle communications, and if any is found, 
what operational constraints are to be placed on the 
spacecraft. While many small satellites do not 
experience constraints in operation, there have been 
some unique cases. As an example, a recently launched 
small satellite causes interference to the ISS video 
communication systems used during Extra-Vehicular 
Activities (EVAs). Due to the potential severity of this, 
the ground station uplink is constrained during EVAs. 
The best advice to avoid these types of constraints is to 
be pro-active about submitting radio specifications 
(preferably around L-6) early in the launch mission 
phase to identify potential issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Developing, launching, and operating a spacecraft is no 
small feat. It is a complicated undertaking that simply 
takes time, effort, resources, and patience. The goal of 
this paper is to provide lessons learned from a launch 
provider perspective on how to interpret and adhere to 
the requirements of manned spaceflight and to 
understand the implications of taking on various satellite 
design facets versus procuring from another source.  
This paper does not cover other extensive topics that 
should be reviewed, such as overall spacecraft design, 
systems engineering principles, and effective project 
management. NanoRacks recommends extensive 
research and education in these fields. An informed 
program is one that makes delivery on schedule and often 
sees the highest degree of mission success. An informed 
team also understands expectations of designing, 
building, launching, and operating a small satellite.  
The small satellite and aerospace community has 
produced copious amounts of open source 
documentation for nearly every part of launching a 
payload into orbit. Along with learning from standard 
classes and schooling, engage with developers that have 
sent small satellites to space in the past. Consult industry 
standard texts such as Space Mission Analysis and 
Design (SMAD) or NASA GEVS. These works were use 
as references in this paper and any expert in the field can 
attest to their usefulness. Experience is key in 
deciphering the countless nuances of spaceflight. 
The small satellite has proven itself to be just as 
competitive, effective, and legitimate as its larger 
brethren that occupy LEO and the rest of the sky beyond 
the von Karman line. Perhaps its most important facet, 
though, and the CubeSat’s original intent, is to provide 
affordable educational opportunities for new engineers 
and researchers to get hands-on-experience designing 
real spaceflight missions, building real flight hardware, 
and operating a real spacecraft in space. For new 
spacecraft programs, this should be the goal. Define 
mission success at the beginning of the project, and 
continually look back to the criteria set forth as a 
reminder to what the final product of the entire mission 
looks like.  
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